New regulations streamline security reviews while restricting foreign adversaries from critical internet infrastructure
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) took the well-flagged action to strengthen the US’s control over submarine cable infrastructure, adopting new rules that streamline the licensing process, while explicitly targeting threats from China and other foreign adversaries.
The regulations, announced 7 August, establish a “presumption of denial” for licence applications from entities controlled by foreign adversaries and prohibit the use of “covered” equipment as defined by the FCC’s Covered List in submarine cable systems – that carry the vast majority of international data traffic, commonly estimated at 95-99%. These measures apply to US cable-landing licensing and submarine cable systems connected to the United States; they do not impose a direct global ban on equipment outside US jurisdiction.
“To address the reality that foreign adversaries like China pose greater threats to submarine cable infrastructure than ever, the new rules emphasise protecting submarine cable infrastructure from foreign adversary threats,” stated the FCC.
The action aligns with the US administration’s 21 Feb America First Investment Policy memorandum, which calls for streamlining domestic investment while tightening scrutiny of foreign-adversary access to critical technologies, with submarine cables representing a particularly vulnerable chokepoint in global communications.
“This week’s unanimous decision protects that critical infrastructure from interference by our foreign adversaries. Continued investment and streamlining our approval processes for submarine cable infrastructure will enhance the resiliency of these critical networks and enable the United States to expand our global technological dominance,” said chairman of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce Brett Guthrie. “We must defend against our adversaries, such as China, who seek to access and tamper with American networks.”
Broader Western response
The FCC’s submarine cable crackdown aligns with similar efforts across the Atlantic, where European Union officials launched its own security initiative in February 2025. The EU Action Plan on Cable Security was described as a significant commitment to strengthening submarine cable resilience through what officials call a “whole resilience cycle” framework: prevention, detection, response and recovery, and deterrence of threats.
The EU’s strategy involves concrete measures across multiple fronts. For prevention, the plan increases deployment of secure, “smart” subsea cables to build redundancy and infrastructure resilience. Detection capabilities are being expanded through basin-specific threat monitoring in areas like the Baltic and Mediterranean seas. Response and recovery efforts focus on creating a coordinated EU crisis framework and establishing an EU cable-vessel reserve fleet to accelerate repairs when incidents occur.
The deterrence component also deploys drone and sensor networks, satellite monitoring, and uses sanctions to deter malicious actors and “shadow fleet” activities that have become an issue since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Financially, the EU is backing this plan with substantial investment under its Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) Digital programme. As of late 2024, the Commission had signed 51 backbone-connectivity projects worth €420 million, targeting improved routes between Europe and regions including Africa, the Atlantic, and the Nordic/Baltic regions. An additional €540 million is earmarked for 2025-2027, bringing total CEF expenditures close to €1 billion, with priority for smart subsea cables and strategic “Cable Projects of European Interest.”
International coordination efforts
The transatlantic focus on submarine cable security has also hit the international stage. The International Telecommunications Union launched an International Advisory Body on Submarine Cable Resilience which wants to be more than a talk-shop.
According to the organisation’s July newsletter, all three of its working groups have successfully launched, covering timely deployment and repair, risk identification and monitoring and fostering connectivity and geographic diversity. The working groups bring together officials from the likes of China, the UK, South Africa and representatives from development banks and regional telecommunications operators.
The advisory body received strong support during the 2025 ITU Council session and was highlighted in discussions at the Internet Governance Forum in Norway. A high-level dialogue on submarine cable resilience was to take place the WSIS+20 Forum in Geneva last month as well.
Strategic risk
The FCC emphasised that submarine cable infrastructure is “more vital to global communications and economic activity than ever,” noting that while it has regulated submarine cables since the mid-20th century, the current threat environment demands updated approaches. As of December 2022, 90 FCC-licensed cable systems reported more than 5300 Tbps of available capacity, with 6800 Tbps in planned capacity for 2024 – but assumably not yet measured.
Beyond the immediate security measures, the FCC is seeking public comment on additional proposals to enhance cable security, including incentivising the use of US-flagged repair and maintenance ships, promoting “trusted technology abroad”, and potentially exempting certain low-risk licence applications from the US govt’s Team Telecom review if they meet high-level security standards. The ship requirement could prove tricky given how many cable ships are not owned by the US.
